Technology is usually thought to be neutral. Tools, for instance, can be used to build a house or to destroy someone’s home. It depends on how a technology is used, whether it is good or bad. Therefore, nuclear energy can be used to power a school, enabling children to learn, or to build weaponised warheads, bringing about death and suffering. Just as much in line with the current zeitgeist might be the question whether advances in artificial intelligence (AI) will merely deprive us of repetitive jobs, which we might be all too happy to hand over, or also of our means to pay for the food on our table. It could turn out to be a blessing – or a curse. This paper argues that basic income exhibits a similarly equivocal potential. There are utopian as well as dystopian visions. There is a Left-leaning vision of Basic Income and there is a Right-leaning vision (although it is increasingly difficult to accurately ascribe these characteristics, as addressed in this issue of Kritische Gesellschaftsforschung). There is an emancipatory vision and there is one that would enhance governments’ ability to exercise social control. In short, as we will see, conceptual considerations on Basic Income vary greatly.

William Beveridge, who played a central role in designing the British Post-World-War-II welfare state and whose name is often used synonymously with the concept of universalism, was already aware of this governing potential. “As a good liberal, [Beveridge] was first and foremost careful to avoid the risks associated with the restrictions on individual freedom that might arise from a system of state policies that is too extensive and pervasive in terms of expenditure and of areas of private life subject to regulation. He always had in mind the possibility that welfare policies can turn into forms of social control” (Benassi, 2010, p. 14). Additionally, the motivation for the implementation of policies is perhaps not limited to altruism. Many scholars will argue that the introduction of social security systems in Germany by Bismarck at the end of the nineteenth century was, at least in part, based on ulterior motives. To Barmeyer, the motivation for a conservative leader such as Bismarck to radically advance social policy, largely stemmed from his conviction to keep the Prussian monarchy in power and to defend the social order from “equalitarian or socialist aspirations”. Plagued by the “nightmare of revolution”, he acted in a “Machiavellian” fashion without regard for ideology, partnering with anyone, to reach his aims. With “a carrot and a stick”, in this case social welfare programmes being the carrot and the persecutory Anti-Socialist Law introduced in 1878 being the stick, Bismarck sought to eliminate the Socialist party as a revolutionary force and integrate the labouring classes into state and society (Barmeyer, 2002). Piven and Cloward would likely agree with this critical observation, when they ascribe a cyclical pattern to relief-giving: “Historical evidence suggests that relief arrangements are initiated or expanded during the occasional outbreaks of civil disorder produced by mass unemployment, and are then abolished or contracted when political stability is restored. We shall argue that expansive relief policies are designed to mute civil disorder, and restrictive ones to reinforce work norms. In other words, relief policies are cyclical — liberal or restrictive depending on the problems of regulation in the larger society with which government must contend” (Piven & Cloward, 1993, p. xiii). They challenge the perspective, that welfare is primarily the result of benevolence, as well as the point of view that relief policies are set on a trajectory that will naturally become more “responsible, humane and generous”. They argue, that “[...] social welfare activity has not greatly aided the poor, precisely because the poor ordinarily have little influence on government”. And further: “the historical pattern [of relief programs] is clearly not one of progressive liberalization; it is rather a record of periodically expanding and contracting relief rolls as the system performs its two main functions: maintaining civil order and enforcing work” (Piven & Cloward, 1993, p. xv). One should therefore proceed with caution, when considering the functions of the welfare state primarily to be “shaped by morality” (Piven & Cloward, 1993, p. xvi). Similarly, Taylor-Gooby (2016, p. 713) paraphrases Offe (1984) on this “contradictory nature of welfare state capitalism”, when pointing out the need to discuss “the interlinkages between economic structure, class interests and ideas at both the level of elite paradigms of political economy and the level of popular ideologies, so that capitalism finds the welfare state both a challenge (by endorsing state interventions against liberal market capitalism) and an essential means of sustaining that system (by legitimating it and mitigating destructive class pressures)”.

Basic income advocates seem to be aware of this potential for social control and many of them have in mind safeguarding recipients against it, as is evident from the definition by the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN): “A Basic Income is a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means-test or work requirement” (Basic Income Earth Network, 2022). They further identify five key characteristics of Basic Income:

An emancipatory basic income that would be difficult to exploit for social control ought to adhere by BIEN’s definition to be universal, in that it is not subject to a means test, paid out to rich and poor alike, and unconditional in that it is obligation-free and not subjected to a willingness to work. It is “the joint operation of these two features that turns basic income into a paramount instrument of freedom” (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017, p. 16).

There is, however, the issue that not everyone who refers to Basic Income adheres by these definitions. In an explanatory comment about BIEN’s definition of UBI, Toru Yamamori admits, that “BIEN’s formal documents (either online or not) have sometimes been helpless to correct misunderstandings or misuses of the term by some media, politicians, activists, opponents, etc. Especially for recent several years, as mainstream media and politics started to pay more attention to a basic income, the misunderstanding and confusion has become greater” (Yamamori, T., 2016). This statement has gained considerable traction in the wake of recent events. “The onset of the 2020 global COVID-19 pandemic led to a marked increase in positive discussion of Universal Basic Income (UBI) in political and media circles. [...] Preferences for UBI were stronger for pandemic times than for normal times. This was partially explained by a number of perceived advantages, such as simplicity of administration and suitability for a changing world. [...] Our results illustrate how a changing social and economic situation can bring about markedly different policy preferences, through changes in citizens’ perceptions of what is currently important” (Nettle, Johnson, Johnson, & Saxe, 2021, p. 1). Suddenly, everyone seems to be talking about Universal Basic Income. Unfortunately, non-experts run the risk of muddling up terminology. For example, in Spring 2020, under the impression of closed businesses and great uncertainty, Spain’s minister for economic affairs Nadia Calvino announced the implementation of the ingreso mínimo vital (“Minimum Living Income”), which was widely mislabelled as a UBI (Forbes, 2020), while in reality it is a conditional and means-tested scheme (Rincon, L., 2020). Similarly, Kanni Wignaraja, in her capacity as Assistant Secretary-General to the United Nations along with Balazs Horvath, Chief Economist for the United Nations Development Programme section Asia-Pacific, published an article for the World Economic Forum (WEF) with the title: “Universal basic income is the answer to the inequalities exposed by COVID-19” (World Economic Forum, 2020). In the article, they make a powerful case for how Universal Basic Income could soften the blow dealt by economic repercussions related to the pandemic. However, the following statement is rather revealing: “[...] [G]ood arguments can be made for having very selective conditions – for instance, some that relate to public goods, like vaccinating all children and ensuring they attend school. Such selective conditions would not undermine the main purpose of eliminating poverty and allow low-income people to take calculated risks, to try to lift themselves out of poverty”.

While these considerations are presumably based on the best intentions, they nonetheless illustrate the desire, displayed by some policymakers, to use basic income as a tool to execute social control over people. Many arguments can be made to justify the necessity for effective tools in the hands of policymakers. A speed camera would be unlikely to have any effect on regulating speed if the government could not enforce fines resulting of speeding. And a lot of people will likely consider speeding as something so dangerous that they would welcome disciplinary measures (albeit grudgingly). However, there is also a danger here that a ruling coalition (including democratically elected) will exploit such tools in order to subjugate minorities (or majorities), perceived as not being part of the in-group. Widerquist argues, that all social arrangements will necessarily create insider-outsider problems. A ruling coalition committed to justice will take steps to integrate as many individuals as possible and will strive to achieve legitimacy. However, “[t]he assumption that those efforts are completely successful is dangerous” (Widerquist, 2019, p. 3). He argues, that it is a slippery slope for anyone to bring about a social structure to which “no one could reasonably reject” (Scanlon, 1998), and thus ultimately decide what is reasonable and what is just. When that happens, it becomes inherently treacherous to distinguish between, what Widerquist calls, “recalcitrants” or “intransigents” (i.e. people with unreasonable objections) and legitimate dissenters. In this vein, an alleged “unreasonableness” could be used as an excuse to oppress legitimate objectors to the social structure. For, if the ruling coalition is reasonable (or considers itself to be), conversely all objectors are unreasonable (Widerquist, 2019, p. 3). A perceived moral righteousness is all too often a prerequisite for committing great evils. Or, paraphrasing Blaise Pascal, the worst decisions are usually made with a good conscience.

The most commonly used term, when talking about the concept at hand, is: Universal Basic Income, or simply Basic Income. Van Parijs and Vanderborght repeat in their recent book their plea, that it is “crucial” that a Basic Income scheme “should be unconditional in a strong interpretation of the adjective” (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017, p. 8). When using the term basic income, they understand it to be individual, universal and obligation free. This strong emphasis on unconditional is much stronger in some languages, other than English. The most commonly used German denomination, for example, is: Bedingungsloses Grundeinkommen (“Unconditional Basic Income”). Similarly in Spanish, there exists the designation Renta Básica Incondicional (RBI) (“Unconditional Basic Income”), although the term Renta Básica Universal (RBU) (“Universal Basic Income”) is also being used.

One could argue that the implementation of drastic restrictions of personal liberties in order to halt the spread of infectious diseases, which began in 2020, constitutes a paradigm change regarding the relationship between the state and its citizens. Many people, the world over, were suddenly forbidden to engage in gainful employment. This applied also to people who had had successful businesses up until then. Suddenly, they found themselves in a situation in which they had to rely on the government for financial support. Many businesses went under, chief among them, brick and mortar stores in the inner cities which were forced shut by government mandate. It is possible that some of those, whose businesses went bankrupt, for lack of livelihood turned to employers such as Amazon, which had been allowed to continue delivering to people’s homes and managed to drastically improve their market share in 2020 (New York Times, 2021). The “hiring spree without equal” (New York Times, 2020), the company subsequently experienced, may have included many job seekers who had previously been autonomous. This may have been the direct result of government intervention and affected many people who became destitute through no fault of their own.¹

The BIEN basic income key characteristic number two, cash payment (see list above), is also something that will have to be emphasised in contemporary basic income debates. According to the BIEN definition, it is to be paid “in an appropriate medium of exchange, allowing those who receive it to decide what they spend it on”. This might come in conflict with current plans to expand Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs). A full-fledged digital currency would allow whoever controls it to specify how it can be spent. Critics point out, that “CBDCs could give governments a powerful tool for economic and social control and unprecedented intrusion into the private financial lives of billions of people. Some authoritarian regimes and developing countries have already embraced digitized currencies while banning or discouraging nongovernmental cryptocurrencies” (Jossey, P.H., 2022).

A digital currency that determines what people can buy is a powerful tool for social control. It is also an essential part of schemes such as the social credit score (SCS) in China. A social credit score “is framed as a set of mechanisms providing rewards or punishments as feedback to actors, based not just on the lawfulness, but also the morality of their actions, covering economic, social and political conduct” (Creemers, 2018, p. 2). “A punishment/reward system based on credit scores will determine whether citizens and organizations are able to access things like education, markets, and tax deductions” (Liang, Das, Kostyuk, & Hussain, 2018, p. 1). “Although Western governments have also explored using reputation technologies and mechanisms in governance and social control contexts, China’s [SCS], as a comprehensive, singularly framed, and actively implemented policy project, knows no equivalent elsewhere in the world [...]” (Dai, 2018, p. 1).

Many of the issues discussed here exist today and are only in part projections of the future. One may therefore argue, that they are unrelated to basic income, which does not currently exist anywhere in the world. As in, not the fault of UBI. This is certainly true. However, there is nonetheless a good argument to be made as to why critics and proponents of basic income alike should consider these issues in relation to basic income design. As we have seen, in conventional welfare states, governments can exercise tremendous social control over those who depend on cash transfers. But the amount of people in this dependent position is limited. They constitute a minority. If basic income were to be introduced, this would change. Everyone would receive it. Initially, for a majority, it might be no more than a bonus. Something they are happy to use but not something they absolutely rely on for their livelihoods. But, “[s]hould the job-automation trends continue as predicted by many researchers, they could lead to a massive worker displacement, increased income inequality, and the creation of a permanent, unemployable ‘underclass’ (Gordon,2013; Kristal & Cohen, 2015; Smith & Anderson, 2014)” (Choi & Kang, 2019). Job displacement need not be a bad thing. A future that is less centred around work could be a blessing, for so long as it does not permanently disenfranchise people from political participation.

In this vein, Bruun and Duuka envision a form of basic income in “response to a potential technological outcome, in which society’s problems become more about the distribution of wealth rather than scarcity” (Bruun & Duka, 2018). On a similar notion, Autor states, that: “If machines were in fact to make human labor superfluous, we would have vast aggregate wealth but a serious challenge in determining who owns it and how to share it. One might presume that with so much wealth at hand, distribution would be relatively straightforward to resolve. But history suggests that this prediction never holds true” (Autor, 2015, p. 28). However, the authors of the World Inequality Report 2022 point out the urgency of necessary redistribution. “We stress at the outset that addressing the challenges of the 21st century is not feasible without significant redistribution of income and wealth inequalities. The rise of modern welfare states in the 20th century, which was associated with tremendous progress in health, education, and opportunities for all [...], was linked to the rise of steep progressive taxation rates. This played a critical role in order to ensure the social and political acceptability of increased taxation and socialization of wealth. A similar evolution will be necessary in order to address the challenges of the 21st century” (Chancel, Piketty, Saez, Zucman, et al., 2021, p. 20). They go on to argue that while nations have become richer, governments have become poor. “Over the past 40 years, countries have become significantly richer, but their governments have become significantly poorer. The share of wealth held by public actors is close to zero or negative in rich countries, meaning that the totality of wealth is in private hands. This trend has been magnified by the Covid crisis, during which governments borrowed the equivalent of 10-20% of GDP, essentially from the private sector. The currently low wealth of governments has important implications for state capacities to tackle inequality in the future, as well as the key challenges of the 21st century such as climate change” (Chancel et al., 2021, p. 15).

Jean-Jacques Rousseau argues in his Social Contract, that “the end [as in purpose] of every system of legislation” consists of “two main objects, liberty and equality – liberty, because all particular dependence means so much force taken from the body of the State, and equality, because liberty cannot exist without it” (Rousseau, 1762, p. 39). His concept of civil liberty, as opposed to “natural liberty, which is bounded only by the strength of the individual [...] is limited by the general will; and possession [...]” (Rousseau, 1762, p. 15). Whereas, “by equality, we should understand, not that the degrees of power and riches are to be absolutely identical for everybody; but that power shall never be great enough for violence, and shall always be exercised by virtue of rank and law; and that, in respect of riches, no citizen shall ever be wealthy enough to buy another, and none poor enough to be forced to sell himself.” (p. 39) He further warns that failing to “allow neither rich men nor beggars” will be “fatal to the common good; from the one come the friends of tyranny, and from the other tyrants” (Rousseau, 1762, p. 115). Evidently, the engine that is meant to keep things fairly equitable in a democracy is stuttering. This observation may appear counter-intuitive at first glance. “[...] [T]he notion that inequality should be at least partially self-correcting in a democracy has a long pedigree in economic theory” (Bonica, McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2013, p. 103). This is based on the assumption that “new inequalities have primarily benefited the top 1 percent and even the top .01 percent. These groups seem sufficiently small that economic inequality could be held in check by political equality in the form of ‘one person, one vote’” (Bonica et al., 2013, p. 103). In reality, however, this form of political self-correction does not seem to unfold and is likely a variation of Hume’s paradox : “Nothing appears more surprising to those, who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers.” The paradox now being, that opinion seemingly trumps sheer force. “When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find, that, as FORCE is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that that government is founded” (Hume, 1777).

One need not be a Marxist to recognise that there is likely an element of truth in the famous statement made by Marx and Engels: “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas; i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling ‘intellectual’ force” (Marx & Engels, 1845). Supposing, for the sake of the argument, that this is indeed the case, perhaps some scepticism is in order when looking at who has in recent years joined the ranks of UBI supporters. “Technology entrepreneurs, including SpaceX founder Elon Musk, as well as Facebook founders Chris Hughes and Mark Zuckerberg, have endorsed the universal basic income as a potential social policy solution to occupational risks from automation (see Hughes 2018)” (Dermont & Weisstanner, 2020, p. 2). Also, a range of Silicon Valley type companies are funding basic income experiments all over the world. From the perspective of UBI supporters, it may be reassuring to have such prominent advocates with extensive funding potential on their side, and they are likely welcomed with open arms. And indeed, the ideological ambiguity of basic income, with champions of the idea coming from both the right and the left, has a long antecedent. But sceptics demur, that “UBI’s cross-ideological appeal is the bug, not the feature” (Battistoni, 2017). Arguing, that basic income has the potential to serve as a “Trojan horse” for both left and right. Critics warn that it could dismantle what is left of the welfare state and replace it with a pittance, while supporters claim it could drastically enhance the agency of non-property-owning classes. Be that as it may, the “version of basic income we get will depend, more than policies with a clearer ideological valence, on the political forces that shape it” (Battistoni, 2017).

The article has shown the potential for social control that is inherent to welfare policies. Following that, it has reiterated BIEN’s definition of UBI and how it is nonetheless vulnerable to misinterpretation by policymakers and media. In response to this, it recommended adding unconditional to the acronym UBI, making it UUBI to avoid confusion with conditional cash transfers (CCTs). The exercise of social control has complex moral implications. Its use is not limited to basic income but may be drastically enhanced by its implementation due to the fact that suddenly a majority (as opposed to a minority) might come to depend on government cash transfers. In an increasingly jobless future and/or the use of lockdown policies, this could theoretically turn currently autonomous actors into dependent ones. Additionally, the article has predicted that a clash with BIEN’s basic income characteristics may be expected if Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) continue to be expanded, for this may undermine the proclaimed agency of cash recipients in how they spend the money in a possible future roll-out of basic income. The same is true for developments towards a social credit score resembling the one in China. Finally, the need for basic income to contribute to a redistribution of wealth was discussed, along with an observation that billionaire supporters of basic income may have reasons other than social justice for supporting the idea.